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which was quite after the heart of King James the Second, and which had been vigorously trained in the household of Prince Rupert's mother; and every month of the years since the Restoration had laid up in him its store of venom against the spawn of Round-heads whom he came to teach their place. That was no reason why King William should not employ him in another government. The stern Dutchman liked him not at all the less for his idolatry of prerogative. The new king did not want on his hands the trouble that would be sure to be made if he should send Andros back again to Boston; but there was another colony which for other reasons needed to be held with a tight hand; and the fact that Sir Edmund had been the unflinching instrument of the last tyrant of the Stuart line secured him only the more favorable reception in Virginia when Virginia was to be brought into submission to the elected sovereign. And Andros was a man of sense enough always to know whom he had to deal with. In his new place he could not but act under a salutary conviction that there was watching him from across the water an eye which it was not easy to elude, and that altogether his best safety was in good behavior; — good behavior being now no longer what had been esteemed such in the last reign. The cold and politic king of the Revolution might have often to conceal his knowledge of the treachery of those immediately about him, but any eccentricities on the part of a governor of Virginia would be pretty sure to be brought to a swift reckoning. Andros was not so romantically devoted to the legitimate monarch but that he could consent to serve the usurper when the usurper sat firm in the saddle; and if he undertook that service, he knew too well the quality of the Orange blood to indulge himself in indiscretions. That Andros made a good enough governor of Virginia does not, in the circumstances, at all incline us to reverse the judgment which history has passed on his administration of New England.

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10. — *The Invasion of the Crimea: its Origin, and an Account of its Progress, down to the Death of Lord Raglan.* By ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE. New York: Harper and Brothers. Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 632.

THE Russian war is a contemporary event, for it is but thirteen years since it was brought to a close by one of the many important treaties that take their name from Paris; but it seems as remote as that contest which brought the career of Napoleon I. to a termination. Since 1856 the world has seen the Sepoy war, the Italian war,

the "Holy war" between Spain and Morocco, the Secession war, the war carried on by Prussia and Italy against Austria, the Abyssinian war, and the Paraguayan war, besides some less significant contests. The changes, too, that have taken place, in large part in consequence of the wars just mentioned, are of a gigantic character. That Bengal army, to the exploits of which England owes in great measure her wonderful Oriental dominion, has disappeared; the East India Company has ceased to exist as a political power, and Queen Victoria sits upon the throne of Akbar and Aurungzebe. The Austrian domination over Italy has ceased, and the kingdom of Italy has come into existence. The territorial possessions of the Pope have been reduced to a pitiful fragment. The Bourbons have been driven from the thrones of the Two Sicilies and of Spain, and Protestant preachers are at liberty to expound their opinions in Naples and in Madrid. American slavery,² which seemed in 1856 to be so firmly seated, has been overthrown. The Germanic Diet has held its last sitting, and sleeps with the Holy Roman Empire. A new nation has risen in Europe, which challenges the European leadership of France. Great Britain has adopted democratic conditions of suffrage, and disestablished the Irish Church. These changes, so great and so unexpected, which have all occurred in less than twelve years, have dwarfed the Russian war to insignificance. The battles of the Alma and of Inkermann, of Balaklava and the Tchernaya, the bombardment of Sweaborg, and the storming of the Malakhoff, strike men as events equally remote and unimportant, because since their occurrence the world has heard of Delhi and Lucknow, Magenta and Solferino, Gettysburg and Chattanooga, Custozza and Sadowa.

This is so long a series of war-pictures that we underrate the importance of the earliest of them; but the Russian war was the opening act of the great drama to which the Italian war and the German war, the Sepoy war and the Secession war, all belong. It was the beginning of the breaking up of that conservative international system which had existed for almost forty years, and which was the chief result of the victory of the grand alliance formed against Napoleon. The first place in Christendom was held by Russia in consequence of the events of 1812-1815; England not appearing to care to dispute the leadership with her ally, though her part in the anti-Gallican confederacy gave her the primacy while war with Napoleon was going on, as she alone could command those enormous sums of money which rendered possible the fighting of such battles as Vittoria, Leipzig, and Waterloo. The Russian hegemony was established by Alexander I.; but the indecisive character of that czar, who never could be said to know his own mind,

and the shortness of his reign after the settlement of Europe in 1815 – 1818, prevented it from being very offensive so long as he lived. Alexander was “the soft triumvir” of the Holy Alliance, and, like James I., he was more inclined to talk about arbitrary power than to exercise it. But his early death led to a great change. Under his successor, Nicholas, the most was made of Russia’s position; and had he been content with solid power, it is highly probable that his empire would have maintained its leading position to this day. That lead was lost by the inability of the czar to bear the test of long prosperity. After towering above his contemporaries for almost thirty years, the first rude blow of adversity prostrated him, and caused his death so suddenly that it is not strange men were inclined to believe that he left the world after “the high Roman fashion.” For a long period he was virtually the arbiter of Europe; and no movement of importance could take place in it without his consent. He was the grand revolution-queller, and his army was a vast European police force. The Poles of “The Kingdom” were subdued by men who had conquered in Turkey and in Persia. Cracow was suppressed in violation of the terms of European treaties. The Turkish dynasty was upheld by Russian forces sent to the Bosphorus to protect it against Mahomet Ali. Hungary, after having achieved her independence of Austria, was prostrated by a larger Russian army than had fought at Borodino; and, had not Radetzky been victorious in Italy, Paskevitch would have marched into that country, and perhaps have achieved new successes on the old battle-fields of Trebbia and Novi.

But, though the talents of Nicholas were great, and his energy corresponded to his talents, he was not content with the substance of power. He required all men to acknowledge his supremacy, and never was more pleased with himself than when his conduct was most offensive to others. The consequence was, that he became the best hated man in Europe, and he was all the more detested because there appeared to be no hope of escape from his supremacy. He was the head of an old dynasty, and he ruled over a nation which had never lost ground from the time it had entered the European system. Nevertheless, the opportunity came. The course he pursued towards Turkey in 1853 gave to France and England good cause for war, and for breaking that power which was so offensive in itself, and so arrogantly wielded. It was impossible for England to consent to give up the East to him; and war was welcome to the new ruler of France, who had an opportunity to deal a damaging blow to the chief of the Continental powers which had overthrown the first Napoleon, and at the same time to gratify the national pride. The contest that followed, though

it did not essentially weaken the Russian empire, nevertheless deprived it of the leadership of Europe, and removed the Muscovite nightmare which had oppressed that continent for a generation. It did more. It made possible, and even easy, the changes in Europe that followed so fast upon the humiliation of Russia. The kingdom of Italy could never have been called into existence had the power of Nicholas remained unshaken; and the continuance of the system of Nicholas would have implied a resolute and successful opposition to that German policy which triumphed in 1866. The Russia that existed from 1814 to 1854 was as much opposed to the unification of Germany as ever was France in the days of the old monarchy. Such men as Cavour, Garibaldi, and Bismarck never could have accomplished what we have seen them bring about, had the strength of the Northern colossus remained unbroken. Even the Sepoy war could not have occurred, had not the Indian soldiers been impressed by the unfounded conviction, — which they shared with men who had better means of knowing the truth, — that the English army had made a poor figure in the contest with Russia.

It is singular that a contest so important in itself, and destined to have consequences so momentous, as the war between Russia and the Western Alliance, should have remained so long without a competent historian. The books which have been written upon it would fill many shelves; but they are either partial narratives, or semi-scientific in their character, or have been prepared for some special purpose. The general histories of the war do not rise above the rank of compilations, and the authors of them have not had access to the best authorities. Mr. Kinglake's work is the most striking exception to the truth of this remark; and even that is not a history of the war. It is the history of "The Invasion of the Crimea"; and, though the operations consequent upon that invasion were so striking as to concentrate attention, and to cause men often to speak of the "Crimean war," it is not to be forgotten that the contest began almost a year before the Allies saw Sebastopol, and that it was waged in Asia as well as in Europe, on the Danube as well as on the Alma, in the Baltic as well as in the Euxine. Then Mr. Kinglake writes only of that part of the war in the Crimea which closed at the death of Lord Raglan, June 28, 1854, ten weeks before the storming of the Malakhoff, and almost nine months before the contest was brought to a close. So far as his work extends, it satisfies every expectation, and makes us regret that he did not so plan it as to make it include a full account of the entire war. Mr. Kinglake's reputation as a writer leaves no occasion to speak of the style of his narrative, and we are convinced that he has written with as much honesty as spirit.

The volume before us, which contains the matter to be found in the third and fourth volumes of the English edition, is a history of thirty-five days, beginning with the evening after the battle of the Alma, on the 20th of September, 1854, and ending with the evening after the battle of Balaklava, on the 25th of October. A great critic—now no more—has objected to Orme's work on the foundation of the British empire in India, that it is minute even to tediousness; adding that in one of his volumes "he allots, on an average, a closely printed quarto page to the events of every forty-eight hours." What would he have said had he lived to read the work of an historian superior "in style and power of painting" to Orme, who allots on an average nearly a closely printed duodecimo page to the events of every forty-eight minutes? We do not object to this minuteness of narrative, for Mr. Kinglake is writing for a specific purpose, and we obtain from his vigorous pages a clear idea of the causes of the failure of the Allies to carry through their original plan, which was based on the belief that Sebastopol would fall before their efforts in a few days.

The current notion is, that the English were responsible for the long and costly siege of Sebastopol; that their timidity and sluggishness was a drag upon the vivacity and energy of the French; and that such men as St. Arnaud and Canrobert were restrained by Lord Raglan from the adoption of measures that would have given Sebastopol to the Allies as quickly as Wellington took Peronne. This estimate of the relative military merits of the two parties to the Western Alliance began to prevail at the very beginning of the war, and it has gained in strength almost to the present time. It had its origin in the almost universal conviction that the French are the first of nations in respect to the martial virtues; while the English, though of undoubted courage, and stubborn to a fault in action, are not otherwise good soldiers. French writers have afforded support to this assumption that English slowness was the cause of that delay which fixed the Allied armies around Sebastopol, when by active measures they might have entered it eleven months before the Russians evacuated it on the fall of the Malakhoff. It was not till Mr. Kinglake appeared in the field that the English side could obtain a hearing.

The first part of his work, which appeared six years ago, was devoted for the most part to the preliminaries of the war, and hardly touched upon military proceedings; but the second part relates almost entirely to the conduct of the war, and shows clearly where the trouble was with the Allies. The French generals showed the same lack of appreciation of the character of the war which was exhibited by some of our generals during the recent struggle. There are, indeed, some

striking points of resemblance between the errors of the Allies in 1854 and the errors of Americans in 1864, which should render us more charitable than we sometimes are when we discuss the history of the war in the Crimea. Between the operations against Sebastopol and the operations against Richmond there is much in common. From the beginning of the expedition to the Crimea to the fall of Sebastopol about eleven months elapsed: it was eleven months, wellnigh to a day, from General Grant's first movement against Richmond to the entrance of the national forces into that much-sought city. The long siege of Sebastopol was the consequence of the neglect of the Allies to seize the Malakhoff, which might have been taken with little exertion immediately after their arrival before the town; and the long siege of Richmond was the consequence of the neglect of our forces to seize Petersburg, which was open to seizure for six weeks after the beginning of the last Virginian campaign. In each case the neglect arose from want of information; and in each case the want of information led to the loss of thousands of lives and the expenditure of millions of money. The Russian war was drawn out to great length because the Allies did not know the key of the position they were assailing; and the Secession war was prolonged full half a year because it was not seen that the vital point of the Rebel position lay miles from the Rebel capital. The Allies, after losing, or throwing away, as Mr. Kinglake shows, several opportunities to win the stake for which they played, were forced to adopt the "hammering" process, and to beat down or carry the strong works that were created by the genius of Todleben.

English critics see, or affect to see, something providential in the course that events took in the Crimea in consequence of the failure of the Allies to take possession of Sebastopol immediately after their brilliant victory of the Alma. Russia, they say, was reduced to the necessity of defending Sebastopol, and this exhausted both means and men, as that town lies at the southern extremity of the Czar's dominions, and could be reached only by long and toilsome marches, in the course of which thousands of men perished. This idea is not original with English critics. They are indebted for it to no less a personage than Napoleon III. When the siege of Sebastopol was at its height, the French Emperor compared it to a running sore, through which all the strength of the sufferer was passing away. The figure, though imperial, is more striking than elegant, and should rank with the coarsest as well as most famous of the facetiæ of the Emperor Vespasian. But the object of war is to succeed,—to win victories as rapidly, as decisively, and as brilliantly as possible, so as to bring the moral power of the world to the support of the victors. Had the Allies taken Sebastopol in three or four days after the Alma, destroyed the Euxine

fleet and the fortifications of the town, and seized the stores there deposited, they would have accomplished far more than was attained by the capture of the Malakhoff almost a year later. It would have been impossible to disguise the fact that the great military monarchy which had governed Europe for a generation had proved unequal to the task of defending that stronghold which had been created as the base of operations against the East. The Allies would have been able to attack other parts of the Czar's dominions, and the Eastern question, which still perplexes nations with fear of change, could have rested for half a century. It is not impossible that the Polish question too might have been settled, and Poland have been recreated, to serve as the shield of Europe. Even Austria has been disposed, since 1814, to consent to the revival of the Polish nation; and she would not have hesitated to join a European Alliance to effect such a revival, had the Allies been entirely successful in the Crimea immediately upon their invasion of that peninsula. As matters turned, the Allies, instead of taking Sebastopol, were put on the defensive, and had to fight long and hard to maintain their hold on Crimean ground, that they might be able, when reinforced, to besiege the town. Their command of the sea enabled them to bring up reinforcements in great numbers, and to do so without loss, while the Russians were compelled to send their men by long and forced marches, so that many of them died without seeing the country they had been ordered to defend, and those who reached it did so in a state of extreme exhaustion. It was the naval power of the Allies that enabled them to effect their purpose, so far as that purpose was effected. They owed as much to their ships as we owed to ours in the contest we waged against the Rebel confederacy.

Mr. Kinglake devotes almost two hundred pages of his second volume (of the American edition) to an account of the battle of Balaclava, in the course of which occurred that wild incident, the charge of the Light Brigade. Less has been said of his account of Lord Cardigan's memorable charge than might have been expected, — probably because that brilliant cavalry commander is dead. Had he lived, he would doubtless have had criticisms to make on some of Mr. Kinglake's observations. The charge was the consequence of a misunderstanding, which leaves no indelible stain on the reputation of any man. Lord Raglan's "third order" seems plain enough to us, who know exactly what he intended it should mean because we have all the explanations that make it perfectly clear; but he must be a bold man who can say that, under the circumstances in which it was received, he would have given to it a different interpretation from that which it received from Lord Lucan. Then came the "fourth order,"

which led to the charge; and though Mr. Kinglake may be right in saying that there is no word in that order "which is either obscure or misleading," it was a most unlucky circumstance that it should have been conveyed to Lord Lucan by Captain Nolan, whose manner was highly offensive to his superior officer, against whom he seemed to insinuate a charge of cowardice. Nolan assumed, we think, that Lord Lucan knew the state of things on the field as well as he himself did, who had just overlooked it; whereas Lord Lucan had no such knowledge; and he inferred that his superior officer objected to making an attack which he had been ordered to make. But the two men were thinking of entirely different positions, — Nolan, of the Causeway Heights; Lucan, of the North Valley. No explanation being made, the charge was ordered, and Nolan was killed before he could bring about an explanation. No fair-minded man can fail to sympathize with Lord Lucan, who was placed in the most distressing position that a soldier can occupy, and whose error of interpretation was such as nine officers out of ten might have fallen into without any impeachment of their capacity. He obeyed what he believed to be a most extraordinary order, and his conduct was strictly soldier-like. Lord Cardigan also obeyed orders, after making such representations as he thought circumstances demanded. Mr. Kinglake follows him down that "valley of death" into which rode the "noble six hundred," — men deserving to rank with those who held the pass of Thermopylæ against the entire power of Persia. Nothing can be more entrancing than his narrative, in which every incident of the charge is told that his conscientious and well-directed labors have enabled him to recover and to preserve. As a French officer said at the time, "It was not war," — for war is a business, as much so as the buying and selling of cotton or flour, — but it was a most daring and dashing act, which will live long in men's memories, and will never be recalled without causing the blood to course more rapidly. Mr. Kinglake comes to the conclusion, in summing up the results of the battle of Balaklava, "that there was no such decisive inclination of the balance as to give to one side or the other the advantage which men call a victory." This means that it was "a drawn battle"; but we incline to the opinion that the advantage of the Russians on the 25th of October was sufficient to lead to that attack on the Allies which they made eleven days later, and which brought about the combat of giants at Inkermann. In this, though they were repulsed, they dealt so severe a blow to the invading force, that the fall of Sebastopol was delayed till the close of the next summer. Had they not felt that the battle of Balaklava was, on the whole, favorable to them, they would not have ventured to repeat their attempt on so great a scale so soon after testing the power of the Allies in the field.